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THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IN AMERICAN 
LAND-USE LAW: A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANALYSIS, A 
SOURCE OF SIGNIFICANT CONFUSION 
Robert J. Hopperton* 
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be 
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.l 
The standard of constitutional review of federal and state legislation is 
an endlessly perplexing question .... 
Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock2 
Over the years, judges and courts have been criticized for need-
lessly confusing many areas of American land-use law. The failures of 
courts to articulate a takings formula, to fashion a coherent approach 
to the comprehensive plan, and to clear up the chaos of ad-hoc, con-
clusory, and parochial local decisionmaking are some notable exam-
ples. Recently, another area of land-use jurisprudence has been sub-
jected to close examination-the presumption of validity of zoning 
regulations3 first articulated by Justice Sutherland in the landmark 
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. J.D. 1972, The Ohio State University; 
B.A. 1963, Baldwin-Wallace College. The author wishes to thank Melissa Becker for her assis-
tance in the preparation of this Article and gratefully acknowledges financial support from the 
University of Toledo College of Law's summer research grant program. 
1272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
2 Daniel R. Mandelker, A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in 
Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1,8 (1992) [hereinafter Mandelker & Tarlockl. 
3 This Article will use, as consistently as possible, the term "presumption of validity." Some 
authors, including Professors Mandelker and Tarlock, supra note 2, at 50, use the term "pre-
sumption of constitutionality," perhaps because that is the term used in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Other authors use "presumption of validity" 
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1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty CO.4 Professor Daniel 
M. Mandelker, in three articles,5 scrutinizes presumptions law and 
argues for a revised basis of presumption shifting in light of the 
famous footnote from United States v. Carolene Products CO.6 
The purposes of this article, however, are to suggest 1) that a 
fundamental problem in the area of land-use jurisprudence is the 
concept of presumptions itself; 2) that abandoning presumptions is a 
sensible starting point for clearing up the "endlessly perplexing ques-
tion"7 of standards of judicial review; and 3) that the key to providing 
a revised basis for judicial review ofland-use regulations is to address 
the most important question: what justifies a court in applying height-
ened judicial review?8 
If we are really concerned about standards of judicial review and 
levels of judicial scrutiny, then these issues should be our starting 
point. We should abandon elusive, ambiguous, and misleading legal 
terms, such as "presumptions," that tend to be substitutes for and 
obstacles to clear analysis. Focusing on the appropriate issues and 
concepts may help us to address and ultimately to resolve the remark-
able confusion that exists in American land-use jurisprudence regard-
ing standards of judicial review. 
This Article begins with an introduction to the concept of presump-
tions and some of the difficulties in defining "presumptions." Section 
II provides a review of presumptions in American land-use law and 
explains the origins of the confusion surrounding presumptions and 
and "presumption of constitutionality" interchangeably. See, e.g., ROBERT M. ANDERSON, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, (3d ed. 1986). 
"Presumption of validity" is used in this article because it is the language used in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. and because "validity" is a more encompassing term which includes 
constitutionality. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89. For instance, zoning regulations are often 
challenged on grounds other than constitutional grounds (e.g. spot zoning, or ultra vires) 
requiring courts to review the regulation's "validity" not just its "constitutionality." For these 
reasons, "presumption of validity," appears to be the more useful term. 
4272 U.S. at 388-89. 
5 See generally Mandelker and Tarlock, supra note 2, at 3; Daniel R. Mandelker, The Shifting 
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, in ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HAND-
BOOK, 409 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1991); Daniel R. Mandelker, Reversing the Presumption of 
Constitutionality in Land-Use Litigation: Is Legislative Action Necessary?, 30 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1986). 
6 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
7 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 2, at 8. 
8 "Heightened judicial review" is used in this Article to mean more active, intrusive judicial 
review of local and state land-use decisions, both legislative and administrative. It is to be 
contrasted with the passive, deferential judicial review that was accorded the local land-use 
decision in Euclid. See 272 U.S. at 395-96. 
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judicial standards of review in land-use cases. Section II concludes 
with a discussion of recent United States Supreme Court cases that 
have employed heightened judicial scrutiny to land-use laws. Section 
III discusses some state courts' attempts to clarify their approach to 
heightened judicial scrutiny as models for avoiding the presumption 
of validity. Finally, section IV offers some concluding remarks on the 
future of presumptions in land-use law. 
1. PRESUMPTIONS: WHAT ARE THEY AND 
WHERE Do THEY COME FROM? 
Commentators in the areas of Evidence and Civil Procedure have 
had much to say about presumptions. Professor James Bradley Thayer, 
in his 1898 A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 
concluded that any detailed consideration of the "mass of legal pre-
sumptions would be an unprofitable and monstrous task."9 Instead, 
Professor Thayer, in an attempt to relieve "the subject of much of its 
obscurity"l0 tried only to point out the general "nature and place of 
this topic in our law."ll In more recent years other commentators have 
also struggled. For example, Professor Charles V. Laughlin in 1953 
worried about the vast array of presumptions, the promiscuous use 
of the word, and the fact that it was a term that had come to be 
"devoid of much of its utility."12 Commentators have described "pre-
sumptions" as: "[o]ne of the most complex topics in the area of evi-
dence";13 "a sea of technicality";14 "the slipperiest member of the fam-
ily of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof"';15 and 
"having suffered badly from rough and careless handling."16 
Many commentators in Civil Procedure and Evidence have attempted 
to define the term "presumption."17 Weinstein's Cases and Materials 
9 JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313 
(1898). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presv,mptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 
195, 196 (1953). 
13 GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 349 
(1989). 
14 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 5122, at 552 (1977). 
15 STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 578 (4th ed. 1992). 
16 JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 183 (1947). 
17 See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1117 (7th ed. 
1983). 
304 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:301 
on Evidence, a widely used law school text, defines "presumption" as 
"a procedural rule requiring the court, once it concludes that the 
'basic' fact is established, to assume the existence of the 'presumed' 
fact until the presumption is rebutted and becomes inoperative."l8 The 
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure concludes that a "presumption is an 
inference which a court is permitted or required to draw to supply 
the place of a fact."l9 The current editors of McCormick on Evidence 
suggest that "a presumption is a standardized practice, under which 
certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to 
their effect as proof of other facts."20 
Just so we do not erroneously conclude that experts limit their 
definition to "procedural rules," "inferences," and "standardized prac-
tices," Professor Laughlin says that presumptions are "magic words" 
that serve as "substitutes for exact analyses" and that are "used to 
indicate numerous and unrelated rules of substantive and procedural 
law."2l Professor Laughlin concludes that "in most instances [pre-
sumptions] could be entirely eliminated without affecting the thought," 
that judicial decisions relating to presumptions "are largely free from 
criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning 
processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confu-
sion," and, finally, that "[c]ourts have too frequently behaved like law 
students when pushed to solve a particular problem. Instead of ana-
lyzing, they glibly seize upon such and such a presumption."22 
In which area of law presumptions reside is another matter of 
controversy. Professor Thayer thought it was erroneous to regard 
presumptions as peculiarly a part of the law of Evidence. Rather, 
Professor Thayer saw presumptions as belonging "to a much larger 
topic, ... that of legal reasoning."23 Professor Laughlin thought the 
term was used variously to indicate unrelated rules about substantive 
and procedurallaw.24 Others cite to a "vast literature" that falls into 
Evidence, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Constitutional 
Law.25 One of the few land-use experts to explore the area of pre sump-
1SId. 
19 CHRISTOPHER J. MILLER & CORA M. THOMPSON, 8 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 
§ 26.268 (3rd ed. 1991 rev. vol.). 
20 STRONG, supra note 15, at 578. 
21 Laughlin, supra note 12, at 195-96. 
22 Id. 
23 THAYER, supra note 9, at 314. 
24 Laughlin, supra note 12, at 195-96. 
25 WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 1116-17. 
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tions concluded that "the problems of presumptions and burden of 
proof may be considered adjective in character."26 
If there is a taxonomy of presumptions, it is certainly not coherent. 
Laughlin noted in 1953 that the article on Evidence in Corpus Ju-
ris Secundum listed one hundred thirteen particular presumptions.27 
Laughlin then tried to develop his own eight categories of presump-
tions, none of which included the presumption of legislative validity 
or presumption of constitutionality.28 Professors Shreve and Hansen 
place presumptions into four categories.29 Over three dozen different 
kinds of presumptions are discussed in the Cyclopedia of Federal 
Procedure.30 
What are practitioners and judges in the land-use area to make of 
all this? Is there a well-settled body of presumption law that has been 
or could be imported effectively into land-use jurisprudence? Are 
there theories and applications of presumption concepts that land-use 
courts could employ with clarity? Or, rather, are presumptions in 
land-use law permanently muddied and unreliable? Are presumptions 
a commodity that land-use courts might use as substitutes for clear 
analysis of topics, such as appropriate standards of judicial review and 
proper levels of judicial scrutiny? Given these confusions and uncer-
tainties, Professors Mandelker and Tarlock correctly conclude that 
the area of presumptions in land-use jurisprudence is "unprincipled 
and disorderly."31 
Professors Mandelker and Tarlock are not alone. Earlier, the highly 
regarded Justice Frederick Hall of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
called the presumption of validity a "shibboleth."32 Another respected 
26 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.14, at 116 (3d ed. 1986). 
27 Laughlin, supra note 12, at 195. 
28 See id. at 196-206. 
29 SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, at 349-50. 
30 See MILLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 400-26. 
31 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 2, at 11. Professors Mandelker and Tarlock come to a 
variety of conclusions about presumptions. They state that the traditional use of presumptions 
is as "legal rules to promote the discovery of truth," and that truth in our legal system "means 
a legitimate finding of fact." [d. at 8. They further explain that "[t]he law of presumptions has 
developed in the context of tension between the powers of the judge and jury to define 
law .... [A] presumption is technically a rule to allocate the burden of producing e,;dence" and 
the "presumption of validity can perform this function"; some "[c]ourts have occasionally applied 
this standard." [d. But Mandelker and Tarlock concede that the presumption of validity "does 
not work well" and that the issues facing a court reviewing the validity of land-use legislation 
are "a mix of empirical evidence and judgment." [d. at 9. 
32 Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 258 (1962). "Shibboleth" 
is defined as "a word or saying characteristically used by adherents of a party, sect, or belief 
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land-use commentator, Norman Williams, has worried about "stomach 
jurisprudence," i.e., judges who manipulate legal concepts in light of 
their own biases and social attitudes.33 At the United States Supreme 
Court level, Justice Marshall,34 Justice Brennan,35 Justice Blackmun,36 
and Justice Stevens,37 have expressed concern about the liberties 
their fellow justices have taken with judicial review of local and state 
land-use and environmental legislation. The numerous concerns about 
presumptions in general, and presumptions of validity and or consti-
tutionality in particular, among academics, practitioners, and all levels 
of the judiciary has shrouded land-use jurisprudence with uncer-
tainty. 
II. PRESUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LAND-USE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 
Most land-use experts view Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty CO.,38 
which involved a challenge to a village ordinance, as the origin of the 
presumption ofvalidity.39 The United States Supreme Court in Euclid 
and us[ually] regarded as empty of real meaning." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2094 (1961). 
33 NORMAN WILLIAMS JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, 1 WILLIAMS: AMERICAN PLANNING LAW 
§ 4.01 at 85 (1988 revision). 
34 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
35 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
36 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
37 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
38 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). 
39 Earlier in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) the Court suggests a presumption 
of validity. Hadacheck dealt with a landowner's challenge a Los Angeles ordinance that banned 
brickyards. Justice McKenna writing for the United States Supreme Court stated: 
[i]t is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of 
government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, 
usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes 
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be 
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. 
239 U.S. at 410 (citing Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915». 
In conclusion Justice McKenna wrote: "[ w]e must accord good faith to the city in the absence 
of a clear showing to the contrary and an honest exercise of judgment upon the circumstances 
which induced its action. [d. In Hadacheck, the Court seemed to be hinting at a presumption 
of validity that did not become explicit until eleven years later in Euclid. [d. 
Interestingly, in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), a land-use case dealing with a challenge 
to a Boston height regulation, Justice Peckham writing for the Court seemed more concerned 
about giving deference to lower court judgments than to legislative judgments: 
[T]his court, in cases of this kind, feels the greatest reluctance in interfering with the 
well-considered judgments of the courts of a State whose people are to be affected by 
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held that "[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning 
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be al-
lowed to control."40 Implicit in the Euclid holding is the placement of 
the burden of proof on the party challenging the zoning ordinance.41 
The Court expressly defined the level or standard of proof that the 
challenger must overcome: if the law's validity is "fairly debatable," 
then the law must stand.42 
Interestingly, in his Euclid majority opinion, Justice Sutherland 
cited to Radice v. New York regarding the validity of legislative 
zoning classifications.43 Radice was not a land-use case. Rather, Radice 
dealt with due process and equal protection challenges to a New York 
statute prohibiting night employment of women in restaurants.44 In 
Radice, Sutherland's discussion of the presumption of validity is more 
detailed than his one-sentence holding in Euclid: 
The legislature had before it a mass of information from which it 
concluded that night work is substantially and especially detri-
mental to the health of women .... Where the constitutional va-
lidity of the statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts 
must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them 
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of 
what the facts established be a fairly debatable one, it is not 
permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it 
against the opinion of the lawmaker. The state legislature here 
determined that night employment of the character specified, was 
sufficiently detrimental to the health and welfare of women en-
gaging in it to justify its suppression; and, since we are unable to 
say that the finding is clearly unfounded, we are precluded from 
reviewing the legislative determination.45 
the operation of the law. The highest court of the State in which statutes of the kind 
under consideration are passed is more familiar with the particular causes which led 
to their passage (although they may be of a public nature) and with the general 
situation surrounding the subject-matter of the legislation than this court can possibly 
be. We do not, of course, intend to say that under such circumstances the judgment of 
the state court upon the question will be regarded as conclusive, but simply that it is 
entitled to the very greatest respect, and will only be interfered with, in cases of this 
kind, where the decision is, in our judgment, plainly wrong. 
214 U.S. at 106. 
40 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1923)). 
41 See id. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 Radice, 264 U.S. at 293. 
45 [d. at 294-95. 
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In Euclid, Justice Sutherland relied on this more extensive discus-
sion that recognizes separation of powers considerations, the ability 
of the legislature to generate a mass of information, and an estab-
lished factual basis for the legislative judgment as contributing fac-
tors to the Supreme Court's decision to defer to the New York State 
legislature.46 Justice Sutherland mentioned the "fairly debatable" stand-
ard of proof and, significantly, indicated that because the Supreme 
Court was unable to say that the legislative finding was not a "valid 
exercise of authority" it could not invalidate the New York legislation.47 
The Radice and Euclid opinions established the model for a defer-
ential standard of judicial review of local land-use decisions.48 Over 
time, state courts have articulated this model in language approximat-
ing the following formula: 
an enactment of the legislative body of a municipality is entitled 
to a presumption of validity. The party challenging the rule or law 
must bear the burden of proof and establish invalidity beyond fair 
debate. In other words, the presumption may be rebutted only by 
a showing that the ordinance lacks a real or substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.49 
The crucial question is whether the party challenging the validity 
of the legislative enactment has rebutted the presumption of validity 
beyond fair debate, not whether the city has established affirmatively 
in the record the public interest involved.50 To require the municipal-
ity to justify its regulation would constitute an impermissible shifting 
of the burden of proof concerning the validity of the enactment.51 
The Euclid model starts with the presumption of validity and in-
cludes burden of proof and standard of proof components.52 It is, 
however, a model based on the elusive concept of presumption, which 
is difficult to define and classify and which renders analysis confusing. 
Moreover, the Euclid model is based on words that, as Professor 
Laughlin has suggested, have become substitutes for analysis or have 
been used to mask an attempt to do something indirectly rather than 
directly. 53 
46 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 391-95. 
47 [d. at 388, 397. 
48 See generally id.; Radice, 264 U.S. at 292. 
49 See, e.g., Willot v. City of Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ohio 1964). 
50 [d. at 203...{)4. 
51 See, e.g., id. 
52 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
53 See LAUGHLIN, supra note 12, at 195-96. 
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B. Nectow v. City of Cambridge and Confused Judicial Review 
The Euclid presumption of validity approach articulated by Justice 
Sutherland soon created problems in later cases for Justice Suther-
land and the rest of the United States Supreme Court. In its 1928 
decision in Nectow v. Cambridge, with Sutherland again writing for 
the majority, the Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of a 
multiple-family residential zoning classification as applied to a portion 
of plaintiff N ectow's property. 54 N ectow's property was located be-
tween single-family residential and other land zoned for and being 
used for industrial purposes.55 In other words, Cambridge had created 
a buffer zone between two incompatible zones-a widely accepted 
zoning technique.56 Even though the Court was dealing with a legis-
lative classification, Justice Sutherland indicated that a "court should 
not set aside the determination of public officers in such a matter 
unless it is clear that their action is unreasonable."57 Ironically, how-
ever, the Court invalidated the Cambridge regulation because the 
"invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly 
injurious .... "58 Conspicuously absent from Justice Sutherland's opin-
ion was discussion of the Euclid presumption of validity, burden of 
proof, or the "fairly debatable" standard.59 Justice Sutherland's avoid-
ance of these standards was particularly interesting in view of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's adherence to the Euclid stand-
ards in upholding the reasonableness of the Cambridge buffer zone: 
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn 
somewhere. There cannot be a twilight zone. If residence districts 
are to exist, they must be bounded. In the nature of things, the 
location of the precise limits of the several districts demands the 
exercise of judgment and sagacity. There can be no standard 
susceptible of mathematical exactness in its application. Opinions 
of the wise and good well may differ as to the place to put the 
54 Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928). 
55 [d. at 186. 
56 A buffer zone is "a strip of land, identified in the zoning ordinance, established to protect 
one type of land-use from another with which it is incompatible. Buffer zones may either be 
shown on the zoning map or described in the ordinance with reference to neighboring districts. 
Where a commercial district abuts a residential district, for example, additional use, yard, or 
height restrictions may be imposed to protect residential properties." MICHAEL J. MESHEN-
BERG, THE LANGUAGE OF ZONING: A GLOSSARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES 6 (1976). 
57 Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-88 (citing Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 
(1926». 
58 [d. at 188. 
59 See id. at 185-88. 
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separation between different districts. Seemingly there would be 
great difficulty in pronouncing a scheme for zoning unreasonable 
and capricious because it embraced land on both sides of the same 
street in one district instead of making the center of the street 
the dividing line .... No physical features of the locus stamp it as 
land improper for residence. Indeed, its accessibility to means of 
transportation, to centers of business, and to seats of learning, as 
well as its proximity to land given over to residence purposes, 
give to it many of the attributes desirable for land to be used for 
residence .... Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers 
in such a matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no 
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise 
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the 
public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare in its proper 
sense. These considerations cannot be waived with exactness. 
That they demand the placing of the boundary of a zone one 
hundred feet one way or the other in land having similar material 
features would be hard to say as matter of law .... The case at 
bar is close to the line. But we do not feel justified in holding that 
the zoning line established is whimsical, without foundation in 
reason.60 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had, in effect, faithfully 
applied and administered the Euclid presumption of validity, burden 
of proof, beyond fair debate standard.61 While that court may have 
had doubts about the legislative judgment, that judgment was not 
clearly unfounded.62 The Nectow opinion written by Justice Suther-
land engaged in less deferential and more active scrutiny in invalidat-
ing the legislative judgment, even though there was obviously fair 
debate about reasonableness.63 As a result, the Nectow decision gen-
erated confusion because the Euclid approach was not overruled, 
although Nectow implicitly called Euclid into question and, without 
explanation, introduced a new, unarticulated, heightened level of ju-
dicial review.64 
The Supreme Court's unexplained change of position to a more 
heightened scrutiny oflegislative decisionmaking muddied the waters 
regarding the appropriate standard of judicial review in zoning cases. 
The uncertainty about judicial review standards and the presumption 
60 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
61 See id. 
62 See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
63 See Nectow, 157 N.E. at 620. 
64 See id. 
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of validity continued without clarification, as the United States Su-
preme Court did not take another zoning case for almost fifty years.65 
Some states have proceeded without a principled basis for judicial 
review of local land-use decisionmaking, paying only lip-service to the 
Euclid model and the presumption of validity approach. In Illinois, 
for example, the Illinois Supreme Court typically discusses the pre-
sumption of validity, places the burden of proof on the party attacking 
the validity of the zoning ordinance, and enunciates the "fairly debat-
able" standard, but then invalidates the zoning provision in whole or 
in part.66 For example, La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 
involved a challenge to a 1942 zoning amendment that established a 
low-rise apartment buffer zone between a golf course and a high-rise 
apartment zone.67 The Illinois Supreme Court went through the ritual 
of reciting the presumption of validity, the burden of proof, and the 
"fairly debatable" standard, but then ignored the city's rationale and 
evidence concerning traffic and parking congestion, decreased light 
and air, and population density and invalidated the buffer zone's forty-
five foot height restriction.68 The La Salle case, which is typical of 
Illinois zoning jurisprudence, has earned that state a reputation for 
hostility to zoning, even though the Illinois Supreme Court pretends 
to embrace the Euclid presumption of validity.69 The Illinois approach 
is reminiscent of Justice Sutherland's approach in Nectow. 70 
Ohio Courts also have mimicked the Nectow and Illinois opinions. 
However, Ohio, long known for erratic land-use jurisprudence,71 has 
followed an even more confused path with respect to the presumption 
65 The next zoning case decided by the United States Supreme Court was Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
66 See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ill. 1955). 
67 [d. 
68 [d. at 612-14 
69 See id. 
70 A more forthright treatment of a court's approach to judicial review is apparent in Justice 
Powell's plurality opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a case involving a 
substantive due process challenge to the city housing code's narrow definition of "family" which 
limited the number of related persons who could live together. The Court invalidated the 
ordinance on the grounds that it interfered with the "sanctity of the family." [d. at 503. Justice 
Powell concluded that "[wlhen a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither 
Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate." 
[d. at 499. The Moore opinion constitutes a much more straightforward, although rather con-
clusory, approach to judicial review of legislative judgments in substantive due process cases 
than either the Nectow or Illinois approaches. 
71 See DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND-USE LAW 3RD § 1.14 at 12-13 (1993); NORMAN WILLIAMS, 
1 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.07 and § 6.09 at 198,204 (1974). 
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of validity.72 Since the 1920's, Ohio courts have approached presump-
tions in land-use law with a kind of schizophrenia.73 For instance, in 
Pritz v. Messer, an early Ohio case involving a takings challenge, the 
Ohio Supreme Court provided a presumption of validity to a Cincin-
nati zoning provision.74 In deference to the local legislature, the Ohio 
Supreme Court explained that: 
[t]he members of this court mayor may not conceive that such an 
ordinance is wisely calculated to preserve the public health, mor-
als or safety. If the ordinance discloses no purpose to prevent 
some public evil or to fill some public need, and has no real or 
substantial relation to public health, morals, and safety, it must be 
held void. When, however, legislation does have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the prevention of conditions detrimental to the 
public health, morals, or safety, no matter how unwise the meas-
ure itself seems to individual judges, it is not for the judicial 
tribunals to nUllify it upon constitutional grounds.75 
Four years later, however, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State ex rel. 
Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, reversed its position regarding pre-
sumptions of validity.76 The court held there that: 
[n]o presumption is indulged in favor of the restriction or limita-
tion of an owner in the use of his premises. Statutes or ordinances 
which restrained the exercise of such right, or impose restrictions 
upon the use of private property, will always be strictly construed, 
and the scope of such statutes or ordinances cannot be extended 
to include limitations not therein clearly prescribed.77 
The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to resolve its split personality re-
garding presumptions. As recently as 1981, two Ohio Supreme Court 
zoning opinions less than five months apart demonstrated the same 
schizophrenia that first emerged in the 1920's. In Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. 
v. City of South Euclid, the court embraced the Euclid presumption 
of validity and upheld a South Euclid land-use decision.78 In an earlier 
decision that same year, the Ohio Supreme Court had invalidated a 
zoning ordinance on the basis that "zoning ordinances are in deroga-
tion of the common law and must be strictly construed."79 
72 See WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 204. 
73 See id. at 204 n.69. 
74 Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 33-34 (Ohio 1925). 
76 [d. at 33. 
76 State ex reI. Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, 166 N.E. 228, 230 (Ohio 1929). 
77 [d. 
78 Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 429 N.E.2d 159, 160 (Ohio 1981). 
79 Sanders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 421 N.E.2d 152, 152 (Ohio 1981). 
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The Ohio Supreme Court has recently added another confusion to 
its jurisprudential muddle regarding presumptions. In Karches v. 
Cincinnati, the plaintiff challenged, on taking and substantive due 
process grounds, Cincinnati zoning as it was applied to a parcel of land 
that was zoned commercial when purchased by the plaintiffs, but 
which was later rezoned to a more restrictive classification.80 The city 
justified its continuation of the rezoning by citing two studies support-
ing the zoning change.81 
Following a bench trial, the trial court struck down the rezoning.82 
The court found that the existing RF -1 zoning83 as applied to appel-
lant's properties was unreasonable, arbitrary, and confiscatory; had 
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare; 
substantially interfered with plaintiffs' right to use their property in 
an economically feasible manner; and therefore, was unconstitutional.84 
The trial court ordered the city to rezone.85 The Ohio Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's order on the grounds that the issue of 
constitutionality was not ripe for determination.86 The Ohio Supreme 
Court determined that the case was ripe for judicial determination 
and then turned to the issue of whether the trial court erred in finding 
the Cincinnati ordinance unconstitutiona1.87 The Ohio Supreme Court 
cited Euclid, indicating that to strike a zoning ordinance on constitu-
tional grounds, plaintiffs must demonstrate beyond fair debate that 
the zoning classification was unreasonable.88 The Ohio Supreme Court 
noted that the trial court had ignored the Cincinnati studies and other 
rationale supporting the legislative judgment and "found it beyond 
the reach of fair debate that the existing RF -1 zoning as applied 
to appellants' properties was unreasonable, arbitrary, and confisca-
tory .... "89 The Ohio Supreme Court changed the focal point of pre-
sumptions, stating that it was guided by the principle that lower court 
judgments supported by competent and credible evidence must not 
be reversed and that every presumption must be made infavor of the 
trial court judgment.90 Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded 
80 Karches v. Cincinnati, 526 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (Ohio 1988). 
81 [d. at 1352. 
82 [d. at 1353. 
83 RF-1 (Riverfront) zoning precludes certain commercial/industrial uses. [d. at 1352. 
84 [d. at 1353. 
85 Karches, 526 N.E.2d at 1357. 
86 [d. at 1353. 
87 [d. at 1357. 
88 [d. 
89 [d. 
90 Karches, 526 N.E.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). 
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that "if the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we 
must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict 
and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict 
and judgment."9J 
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court conflated two different presump-
tions: one presumption attaching to the legislative classification, the 
other to the trial court judgment and verdict.92 But in layering one 
presumption on top of another, the Ohio Supreme Court failed to 
identify the inconsistency of its analysis. If the evidence is "susceptible 
to more than one construction,"93 the zoning could not be beyond fair 
debate regarding unconstitutionality. However, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has only extended in later cases its difficulties regarding conflicting 
presumptions.94 In view of the many confusions and eccentricities of 
the Ohio Supreme Court regarding presumptions, it would be difficult 
for any land-use stakeholder in Ohio to predict litigation outcomes. 
Confusion about presumptions has also figured into judicial review 
of administrative actions.95 Administrative or quasi-judicial actions 
taken by local decisionmaking bodies may be treated differently from 
legislation because the actions are not legislative actions.96 While leg-
islative actions receive a Euclid analysis, some courts, after strug-
gling with the difficulties defining legislative as opposed to administra-
tive decisions,97 have accorded administrative decisions less deference.98 
For example, a court may use a presumption of validity for review of 
administrative actions, but it may then adopt a lower standard of 
proof, such as "preponderance of the evidence" instead of "beyond fair 
debate."99 Alternatively, the burden of proof might be shifted to the 
local government. IOO The presumption of validity could even be con-
verted into a presumption of invalidity.JOJ 
911d. 
92 See id. 
931d. 
94 See, e.g., Gerijo v. City of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ohio 1994). 
95 See generally, DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER URBAN PLANNING AND 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 2d §§ 6.1--B.13 [hereinafter HAGMAN & JUER-
GENSMEYER]; ANDERSON, supra note 3, at Chap. 27. 
96 HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 95, § 6.4. 
97 Just what decisions are administrative? For example, is a smalltract rezoning administra-
tive even though it is adopted by a legislative body? See id. It would be helpful if courts clearly 
defined legislative and administrative actions and indicated what variety of judicial review 
applies. With a couple of notable exceptions, they have not done so. See infra Section IV. 
98 HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 95, § 6.4. 
99 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 3.16. 
100 See id. § 3.17. 
101 See id. 
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C. Heightened Scrutiny of Land-Use Legislation 
Confusion regarding presumptions of validity in a variety of forms 
has been a constant in American land-use jurisprudence. There have 
also been those who strenuously criticized the presumption of validity 
itself.102 Some courts have gone so far as to reverse the presumption 
and review land-use laws with a heightened level of judicial scru-
tiny.lo3 A critic of exclusionary zoning, Justice Frederick W. Hall of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, attacked the Euclid presumption of 
validity in his famous dissent in Vickers v. Township Committee of 
Glouster Township.104 As Justice Hall explained: 
[a]ny local exercise of that [zoning] power is presumed valid until 
overcome by an affirmative showing of unreasonableness. Judicial 
review is so narrow that this showing can never be made if even 
a 'debatable issue' exists .... The trouble is not with the princi-
ples [of presumption of validity and beyond fair debate]-if we 
did not have them, governments could not well operate at all-but 
rather with the perfunctory manner in which they have come to 
be applied .... Judicial scrutiny has become too superficial and 
one-sided. The state of the trend is exemplified in the language of 
the majority that 'if the amendment presented a debatable issue 
we cannot nullify the Township's decision [to exclude mobile homes] 
that its welfare would be advanced by the action it took.'105 
Justice Hall advocated heightened judicial review to prevent a mu-
nicipality from erecting an isolationist wall on its boundaries. Four-
teen years after the Vickers dissent, with Hall writing his final judicial 
opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington County 
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel shifted the presumption of 
validity by holding that every municipality through its zoning must 
"presumptively" make an appropriate variety and choice of housing 
realistically available.106 
More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportu-
nity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate 
income housing and its regulations must affirmatively afford that 
opportunity, at least to the extent that municipality's fair share of 
present and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations 
102 See id. 
103 See generally id. §§ 3.18-22. 
104 37 N.J. 232, 262-63 (1962)(Hall, J., dissenting) cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 
233 (1963). 
105 [d. at 256-59 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
106 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 713-32 
(N.J.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
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must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the 
heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dic-
tate that it should not be required to do SO.107 
Thus, in an effort to provide affordable housing, Justice Hall turned 
the usual presumption of validity on its head, employing heightened 
judicial scrutiny in a clear, straightforward fashion. lOB 
More recently, in 1982, President Ronald Reagan's Commission on 
Housing was implicitly critical of the presumption of validity in advo-
cating deregulation of the housing market.109 The Commission Report 
criticized the Euclid decision and suggested that heightened judicial 
review of land-use regulations was necessary.110 The Commission rec-
ommended that no land-use regulations that deny or limit the devel-
opment of housing should be deemed valid unless their existence or 
adoption is necessary to achieve a "vital and pressing governmental 
interest."111 The report thus transformed the Euclid presumption of 
validity into a presumption of invalidity for certain housing regula-
tions.112 In essence, the Commission recommended that legislatures 
enact measures that, in effect, prescribe an activist, pro-property 
rights approach for judicial review of land-use regulations.113 
The heightened review standards advocated by both the liberal 
Justice Hall and the conservative, anti-regulation President's Com-
mission had in some ways been heralded in the two-tier analysis that 
emerged in the equal protection area.114 Judicial review of equal pro-
tection cases incorporated two different levels: "minimal scrutiny" or 
rationale-basis review in typical equal protection cases,115 and height-
ened or "strict scrutiny" in cases involving suspect classifications or 
impinging upon fundamental constitutional rightsy6 To determine 
which level of review was appropriate in an equal protection case 
1071d. at 724-25. 
108 See id. at 732. 
109 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 201 (1982). 
110 See id. at 202. 
111 ld. at 200-02. 
112 I d. at 200. 
113Id. 
114 DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 82--83 
(1977). 
115 For an example of minimal judicial scrutiny in a zoning case see Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
116 For a discussion of suspect classifications see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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courts use a multi-part inquiry.ll7 Significantly, nowhere in this multi-
part inquiry does a presumption of validity come directly into play.118 
A court that utilized this two-tier, multi-part approach to judicial 
review ofland-use regulations challenged on equal protection grounds 
did so in a clearer, more direct fashion than a court using the Euclid 
model.119 
D. New Concepts of Judicial Review 
A different approach to judicial review is discernible in recent 
United States Supreme Court land-use and environmental decisions. 
Since 1987, the United States Supreme Court has decided four very 
important cases involving takings challenges: Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,120 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,121 Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council,122 and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 122 Each of these opinions 
involves, in one way or another, heightened judicial scrutiny.124 Inter-
estingly, the two justices who authored these four opinions, Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, appear not to have been con-
117 
1. Does a legal classification exist that differentiates among citizens? 
2. Is the legal classification the result of state action? If either question is answered 
negatively, then there can be no equal protection violation. If both questions are 
answered positively, then one of the two equal protection tests must be chosen. 
3. Is the classification based on suspect criteria? 
4. Does the classification affect fundamental rights? 
If either question 3 or 4 is answered affirmatively, then the compelling state interest 
test will be applied and questions 5 and 6, infra must be answered affirmatively for 
the classification to withstand the equal protection challenge. 
5. Are there compelling state interests to justify the classification? 
6. Is the classification necessary to accomplish the compelling state interests? 
If both questions 3 and 4 are answered negatively, then the rational basis test will 
be applied. Under the rational basis test questions 7, 8, and 9, infra must be answered 
affirmatively for the classification to withstand the equal protection challenge. 
7. Does the classification serve permissible state objectives? 
8. Is the classification rationally related to the permissible state objectives? 
9. Is the classification applied in a nondiscriminatory manner? 
GODSCHALK, supra note 114, at 83. 
118 [d. 
119 See MANDELKER & TARLOCK, supra note 2, at 12--14. 
120 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
121 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
122 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
123 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
124 See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-95 & n.8; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
836-37; First English, 482 U.S. at 321. 
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cerned about, or encumbered by, the Euclid presumption of validity.125 
In each case the Court engaged in heightened judicial review, but 
neither of the two authors provided justification for the non-tradi-
tional, heightened judicial review.126 For example, in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,. the Court may have given reasons for 
modifying substantive takings law, but nothing more than conclusory 
reasoning accompanied the Court's dismissal of the South Carolina 
legislature's findings and express purposes regarding its Beachfront 
Management Act.127 Instead, traditional judicial respect for legislative 
judgments seems to have been replaced by thinly veiled contempt for 
legislative findings. 128 In Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that 
Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent relied upon a strong presumption 
of constitutional validity/29 and went on to say that "Justice STEVENS' 
dissent takes us to task for placing the burden on the city to justify 
125 See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309. 
126 One commentator, Norman Williams, claimed that what Justice Scalia did in Nollan was 
"really startling." WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 33, § 5A.04, 142. Williams quotes Justice 
Scalia: 
Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN's claim, ... our opinions do not establish that these 
standards are the same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. To 
the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally been quite 
different. We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate 
state interest' sought to be achieved, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ... , 
not that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might 
achieve the State's objective ... quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 466 (1981) .... JUSTICE BRENNAN relies principally on an equal protec-
tion case, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., supra, and two substantive due 
process cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488 (1955) 
... and Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ... , in support of 
the standards he would adopt. But there is no reason to believe (and the language of 
our cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property 
is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal 
protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any reason to believe that 
so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards for due process challenges, 
equal protection challenges, and First Amendment challenges are identical. Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) ... , does appear to assume that the inquiries are 
the same, but that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of our later cases. 
Id., quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 n.3 (citations omitted). 
Williams labels Justice Scalia's approach "strict scrutiny" but in this passage one finds no 
discussion of presumption of validity, burden of proof, or beyond fair debate. WILLIAMS & 
TAYLOR, supra note 33, at § 5A.04, 142. Rather, Justice Scalia was discussing the substantive 
law of takings, due process, and equal protection. N ollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. Justice Scalia does 
not discuss standards of judicial review and it is obvious that the traditional, deferential, 
Euclidean variety of judicial review was no obstacle to his pro-property rights modifications of 
substantive takings law. See id. 
127 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992). 
128 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994). 
129Id. 
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its required dedication."13o Rehnquist then concluded that "[h]ere, by 
contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to condition peti-
tioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In 
this situation, the burden properly rests on the city."131 
On the one hand, the lack of a set formulal32 for deciding the sub-
stantive issues relating to takings questions has provided property 
rights-oriented justices, such as Scalia and Rehnquist, a fertile play-
ground for new concepts such as "total takings,"133 "essential nexus,"l34 
and "rough proportionality."13s On the other hand, the confused and 
elusive state of presumptions of validity in land-use law and the 
absence of a principled basis for determining standards of judicial 
review has created a vacuum for activist, property-rights judges to 
exploit.136 In recent takings cases, the United States Supreme Court 
majority has been reviewing more actively state and local land-use 
decisions without saying exactly what it was doing or why.137 These 
opinions involve a significantly heightened judicial scrutiny and, as 
was true in Lucas, even the suggestion that legislative findings de-
serve virtually no presumption of validity.138 
III. CLARIFYING HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
While the Euclid presumption of validity became the ritualistic 
model in American land-use jurisprudence, courts have confused it, 
misused it, and ignored it, resulting in difficult-to-assess standards of 
judicial review and levels of judicial scrutiny. In the high-stakes game 
of land-use decisionmaking, the key players, such as the landowners, 
developers, neighbors, governmental regulators, and excluded parties 
deserve more precision and predictability from the law. To that end, 
some state courts have provided significantly more clarity and consis-
tency concerning their approaches to heightened judicial review.139 
A recent case that dealt directly and carefully with heightened 
judicial review is Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County 
130 Id. at 2320 n.8. 
131Id. 
132 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992); see also Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
133 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
134 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
135 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. 
136 See id. 
137 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
138 See supra notes 38-101 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Fasano v. Board 
of County Comm'rs., 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
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v. Snyder. 140 That case involved the Brevard County Commission's 
denial of plaintiffs' half-acre rezoning request.141 The rezoning, which 
was consistent with the county's comprehensive plan, had been rec-
ommended for approval by the local planning and zoning board.142 
Nonetheless, the commission denied the request without providing 
any justification for its decision.143 The trial court, after stating its 
view that a stricter standard of judicial review was required for 
protection of property owners, held that the petition for rezoning was 
consistent with the comprehensive plan, that there was no assertion 
or evidence that a more restrictive zoning classification was necessary 
to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and 
that the denial of the requested zoning classification without reasons 
or factual support was arbitrary and unreasonable. l44 
In its appeal before the Florida Supreme Court, the county con-
tended that the standard of review for its denial of the plaintiffs' 
rezoning request was "whether or not the decision was fairly debat-
able."145 The Florida Supreme Court weighed the pros and cons of the 
deferential judicial review afforded by the "fairly debatable" standard 
of proof, and acknowledged critics' concerns about "'neighborhoodism' 
and rank political influence on the local decision-making process"146 
and that "zoning decisions are too often ad-hoc, sloppy and self-serv-
ing decisions with well-defined adverse consequences without off-set-
ting benefits."147 
The first issue addressed by the Florida Supreme Court was whether 
the county's action on the rezoning application was legislative or 
quasi-judiciaU48 The court noted that legislative decisions would be 
sustained as long as they were fairly debatable, but that quasi-judicial 
decisions would be subject to review and upheld only if supported by 
substantial competent evidence.149 The court reviewed the criteria for 
determining whether local actions are legislative or quasi-judicial and 
concluded that the county commission's action on the rezoning appli-
140 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993). 
141Id. at 475. 
142 Id. at 471. 
143Id. 
144 Id. at 472. 
145 Snyder, 627 So.2d at 472. 
146Id. at 472-73, (citing RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 1966). 
147Id. at 473, quoting Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 2, at 2. 
148Id. at 474. 
149Id. 
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cation was in the nature of a quasi-judicial proceeding.150 The court 
went on to conclude that its level of review would therefore be "strict 
scrutiny."151 The court indicated that the phrase "strict scrutiny" de-
rives from the Florida requirement that the rezoning decision be in 
strict compliance with the local comprehensive plan.152 The court fur-
ther noted that "strict scrutiny, as used in the review of land use 
decisions must be distinguished from the type of strict scrutiny re-
view afforded in some constitutional cases" that involve fundamental 
rights.153 Based on these considerations, the court held that the "land-
owner seeking to rezone property has the burden of proving that the 
proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan and complies with 
all procedural requirements of the zoning ordinance."154 Upon such a 
showing, "the burden shifts to the governmental board to demon-
strate that maintaining the existing zoning classification with respect 
to the property accomplishes a legitimate public purpose."155 In effect, 
the landowners' traditional remedies will be subsumed within this 
rule, and the board will not have the burden of showing that the 
refusal to rezone the property was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
unreasonable. If the board carries its burden, a landowner's only 
remaining recourse will be to demonstrate that the existing zoning is 
confiscatory and thereby constitutes a taking.156 
With regard to quasi-judicial decisions, the Florida Supreme Court 
avoided discussion of, or entanglement with, presumptions of validity 
and focused directly on issues of judicial review and levels of judicial 
scrutiny.157 Regardless of whether one agrees with the substantive 
result, the Florida Supreme Court provided a forthright presentation 
and resolution of the heightened judicial review issues, avoiding reli-
ance on presumptions of validity.158 
An earlier Oregon case also achieved clarity in dealing with height-
ened judicial review. Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Washington County involved a challenge by neighbors to a thirty-two 
acre mobile home rezoning.159 The Oregon Supreme Court stated that 
150 Snyder, 627 So.2d at 474-75. 
151Id. at 475. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 476. 
155 Snyder, 627 So.2d at 476. 
156 See id. at 475. 
157Id. at 474-75. 
158 See id. 
159 Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 25 (Or. 1973). 
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the traditional Euclid model of judicial review was not appropriate 
for quasi-judicial zoning decisions.l60 The court indicated that it granted 
review to consider three questions relating to standards of judicial 
review: 1) By what standards does a county commission exercise its 
authority in zoning matters? 2) Who has the burden of meeting those 
standards when a request for change of zone is made? 3) What is the 
scope of court review of such actions?161 Without mentioning presump-
tion of validity in these three issues, the court indicated that any 
meaningful decision as to the proper scope of judicial review must 
start with a characterization of the nature of that decision.l62 The 
court, relying on the Oregon requirement that local governments 
have a comprehensive plan, and citing the dangers of the "almost 
irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic inter-
ests on local government," rejected the notions of presumptively valid 
legislation.163 The court concluded that the assumed validity associ-
ated with legislative decisions is inappropriate for quasi-judicial ac-
tions, that quasi-judicial actions require active judicial review, that 
the burden of proof to show conformity with the comprehensive plan 
was placed on the parties seeking the change-here the developer and 
the county-not the plaintiff neighbors, and finally, that the burden 
of proof was variable depending on the degree of change involved.l64 
The Fasano decision is an example of clarity and directness com-
pared to many decisions that confuse issues of judicial review with 
discussions of presumptions of validity.165 The court did not use slip-
pery, confusing terms-except to avoid applying them-and provided 
a clear notion of what it was doing, and how and why it was doing it.166 
The Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder and Fasano opin-
ions provide useful models for courts that seek to avoid the confu-
sions, temptations, and entanglements of the presumption of valid-
ity.167 Both opinions provide clear, direct approaches to applying a 
heightened standard of judicial review. Each opinion also offers a 
160 See id. at 30 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
161 [d. at 25. 
162 [d. at 25-26. 
163 [d. at 23. 
164 See Fasano, 507 P.2d at 29-30. 
165 See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928). 
166 See Fasano, 507 P.2d at 29-30. In Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975), the 
Oregon Supreme Court required the land-use restrictions in a zoning ordinance to be consistent 
with a comprehensive plan. See DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND-USE LAW § 3.16 (3d ed. 1993). 
167 Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30; Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 472-73 
(Fla. 1993). 
1996] PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 323 
rationale for its scrutiny of the local land-use decision-making.l68 The 
Snyder court pronounced its concern about the "effect of 'neighbor-
hoodism' and rank political influence on the local decision-making 
process."169 Fasano expressed the court's uneasiness about the dan-
gers of "the almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by 
private economic interests on local government."170 If other courts 
followed these examples, reasoning processes relating to the stand-
ards of judicial review would be strengthened and the use of presump-
tions, a word that "has been so promiscuously used as to be devoid of 
much of its utility,"171 could be avoided. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt the presumption of validity has been a source of 
confusion and a substitute for clear analysis. It has been an obstacle 
to clarity of thought about standards of, and justifications for, the 
various types and levels of judicial review. As a result, most courts 
have either been unable to overcome these confusions or have been 
unwilling to resist the temptations to manipulate presumptions dis-
cussed above. 
Because courts have, for the most part, done little to achieve clarity, 
coherence, and integrity in their land-use jurisprudence, commenta-
tors need to do significantly more to help establish a climate of opinion 
that encourages judges to adopt principled bases for judicial review 
of land-use regulations. The presumption-free models supplied by 
Florida and Oregon can be instructive. Courts will also benefit greatly 
if commentators can articulate the importance of clear, well-defined, 
and carefully formulated standards of judicial review that must be 
applied before judges make decisions on substantive issues such as 
takings, substantive due process, spot zoning, and consistency with a 
comprehensive plan. 
At the same time, experts have been unprepared to avoid these 
entanglements. Professors Mandelker and Tarlock have merely begun 
the necessary inquiry. Their 1992 proposal of a revised basis for 
shifting the presumption of validity is a formidable attempt to recon-
cile the confusions and uncertainties of present land-use jurispru-
dence and to establish a principled basis for judicial review ofland-use 
168 See Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30; Snyder, 627 So.2d at 472. 
169 Snyder, 627 So.2d at 472-73. 
170 Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. 
171 Laughlin, supra note 12, at 195. 
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regulations. As the foundation for their proposal, Mandelker and Tar-
lock provide a new look at, and careful analysis of, Carolene Products 
Footnote Four.172 Mandelker and Tarlock recognize Footnote Four as 
providing a "critical theoretical foundation for presumption-shifting" 
when land-use regulations are challenged.173 Nevertheless, Mandelker 
and Tarlock base their proposal on the presumption of validity and 
presumption shifting. As a result, their attempt fails to get beyond 
the entanglements, analytical problems, and confusions inherent in 
the use of presumptions that are the subject of this article.174 
172 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 2, at 18--30. 
173 [d. at 18. 
174 Mandelker and Tarlock expend substantial effort on "what the Footnote says" and "what 
the Footnote means." They acknowledge, however, that the Footnote has differences in lan-
guage, lacks clarity, and is ambiguous. In addition, they acknowledge the "subtle distinctions" 
between the two concepts of presumptions. An excerpt from their proposal demonstrates 
Mandelker's and Tarlock's difficulty in achieving clarity: 
The introductory clause in the Footnote refers to the presumption of constitutionality, 
but paragraph three speaks of heightened judicial review. The question is whether 
there is a difference between these two ways of defining the judicial role in reviewing 
government regulation. 
The phrase "heightened judicial review" usually means a more intrusive judicial 
review of regulatory legislation. The Court does not apply the usual rule, that it will 
uphold legislation if its purpose is ''reasonably debatable." Instead, the Court requires 
more justification for the legislative regulation, such as proof of a "compelling govern-
mental interest" if strict scrutiny judicial review is applied under the Equal Protection 
Clause. In effect, the Court asserts the constitutional power to limit the list of consti-
tutionally protected purposes. 
Our argument is the allocation of the burden of persuasion and proof in litigation 
through the presumption of constitutionality can be used only to allocate the burden 
of justification in litigation and can favor either the government that defends, or the 
litigant who attacks, regulatory legislation. Shifting the burden to government by 
changing the presumtion only requires government to come up with a more focused 
and empirically based justification for legislation than is required by the reasonably 
debatable rule. The presumption shift means the court is less willing to accept the 
outcome of the political process when it is challenged in court. 
The distinction between these two concepts of presumption is admittedly subtle. 
Heightened judicial review will usually occur when the presumption is shifted against 
government because the question is which party to the litigation must bear the burden 
of proving or disproving the constitutionality of a regulation. Heightened judicial 
review occurs because government is put to its proof. It may not hide behind assump-
tions about legislative policy and purposes that protect it from inquiry into the legiti-
macy of its regulation. A court may, but is not compelled, to modify substantive 
constitutional doctrine. Still, we argue it is useful to distinguish between a standard of 
review and a procedural doctrine. 
Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 2, at 24. 
Mandelker and Tarlock's task may have been simplified and facilitated by asking, not what 
justifies presumption-shifting, but rather, what justifies heightened judicial review. Such an 
inquiry would avoid the many confusions attendant to "presumptions" and directly address the 
fundamental issue. 
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Abandoning presumptions of validity will remove one significant 
source of confusion and allow both courts and commentators to focus 
on the key issue of standards of judicial review. If courts can be 
persuaded to abandon presumptions, it will become significantly eas-
ier for land-use stakeholders, practitioners, and commentators to as-
sess what courts are really doing and to predict what they may do in 
the future. 
Moreover, the stage will be set for meaningful discussions by both 
courts and commentators concerning what the true rationales for 
deferential and heightened judicial review may be. Not only are Pro-
fessors Mandelker and Tarlock encouraged to rethink their proposal 
and to rejoin the debate, but hopefully other commentators will join 
the discussions and debates as well. Through the crucible of discussion 
and debate, clarity, coherence, and integrity in land-use jurisprudence 
can and will emerge. 
